The paper aims to present the legal tools used by the Austrian legislature to exert control over the federal government and its members, particularly the role of the commission of inquiry and its position in the system. The assumed research hypothesis is that the scope and efficiency of legislative oversight of the executive in Austria have increased due to the strengthened position of the parliamentary minority. The key factor was the 2014 Constitutional Amendment allowing the opposition to propose issuing a commission of inquiry at the National Council. The paper consists of four parts. First, it describes the instruments of political control the Austrian parliament has at its disposal. Next, it analyses the application of the individual supervisory tools at the National Council in the years 2006–2021. The third part presents the procedure for issuing a commission of inquiry and its powers. The reflections are concluded by an analysis of the hitherto existing commissions of inquiry in the Second Republic in terms of their frequency, the scope of inquiry, proponents, and the duration and intensity of their work. The paper also seeks to answer the questions of the scrutiny potential of the National Council, the importance of commissions of inquiry in system practice in Austria and the possible political consequences of the changes to how the parliamentary commissions of inquiry are issued and how they function.