From political apathy to mobilization
– the sources, dynamics and structure
of protests in contemporary Russia
Więcej
Ukryj
1
Faculty of History and Cultural Heritag,
The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Cracow, Poland
Data publikacji: 19-12-2019
Studia Politologiczne 2018;48
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE
STRESZCZENIE
The aim of this article is to analyze the most important factors which have influenced the
increased protest sentiment in Russian society since the annexation of Crimea. The author
proceeds from an analysis of issues concerning the political alienation of the Russian society, which distances Russians from those in power and minimizes their influence
on public affairs, and outlines the circumstances in which Russians are mobilized to
action. One of the more important questions discussed in the article concerns the motives
that prompt certain social groups to break with conformity and publicly express their
dissatisfaction with and opposition to the actions of the ruling elite. It is necessary to
look closely not only at the structure of the protest movement, but also its dynamics and
evolution, attempting to ascertain the scale of its potential.
INFORMACJE O RECENZOWANIU
Sprawdzono w systemie antyplagiatowym
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