This article analyzes the issues of managing crises in the context of fragile states, co-optations and, consequently, focuses on the logic of political survival. Excluding particular social groups from exercising power increases the risk of serious internal political tensions and even civil war. Yet, the question remains: why do fragile state governments exclude social groups in the first place if this threatens the survival of the regime? In the political regimes of fragile states, an important response to patterns of social exclusion can be found in the formation of political coalitions. Ruling social groups have sufficient incentive to exclude groups even more powerful than themselves because they cannot credibly pledge loyalty to the ruling group. Hence, potential allies avoid joining coalitions with stronger ruling parties. The above problem of mutual support and joint commitment leads to potentially power-equivalent political alliances. Yet, political regimes of fragile states facilitate the creation of coalitions of less balanced power (co-option) with institutions that alleviate the problems of political tensions and differences. The above arguments regarding forming alliances and political parties are tested based on data on the political groups “grasping” power and their status. Moreover, in political regimes of fragile states, the elites “holding power” are more willing to conclude agreements that balance the political power of all possible coalition partners. In this context, however, the diverse specificity of political groupings determines the degree of balance of the particular political scene.